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ABSTRACT 
Metaphor has long been a mesmerizing literary phenomenon that attracted attention of literary 
critics and brought joy and fulfillment to literary hedonists. It shows the writer’s greatness of 
talent in presenting the ordinary in an extraordinary artistic fashion, of transforming the plain 
into the sublime, of overcoming the physical in favor of the transcendent. However, with the 
discovery of conceptual metaphor within Cognitive Linguistics, scientific community and 
ordinary people were baffled. It turned out that metaphor is not at all a novel linguistic and 
literary creation, but rather an omnipresent everyday occurrence. Furthermore, metaphor became 
a matter of thought rather than language, and this thought was characterized by being embodied 
in nature. The prime working principle commanding metaphor was said to be the same one that 
governs our cognitive constitution. Subsequently, the flood of cognitive research and 
neuroscientific investigation started to increase significantly in the hope to understand this 
intricate and peculiar phenomenon. The two major theoretical approaches to the study of 
conceptual metaphor that will be dealt with in this work are Conceptual Metaphor Theory, with 
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson as its most fierce proponents, and Blending Theory, 
established by Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner. The aim of this work is the comparison 
between the two theories and the presentation of their wide scope of application within different 
aspects of human intellectual endeavor. 
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1. Introduction 
Pablo Picasso once said, Art washes away from the soul the dust of everyday life. This is 
a classic example of a novel linguistic expression that literary theorists call metaphor. 
Translating this quote into conventional, everyday language, we can say that the artist deems art 
to be an invigorating liquid, like water, reviving human soul the same way water does a 
biological organism, purifying our spirit as earth is cleansed after heavy rain. The meaning of a 
metaphor is prone to subjective experience, although it must be grounded in something universal 
and conceptually analogical, available to common human understanding, in order for the reader 
or listener to understand the idea and semantic implications behind the creative expression. 
However, metaphor is not at all a young literary figure. Since ancient times, philosophers 
recognized its importance. With regard to metaphor as a novel linguistic expression, Aristotle 
states: “metaphor is the application of an alien name by transference either from genus to 
species, or from species to genus, or from species to species, or by analogy, that is, proportion”1. 
Metaphor is often regarded as poetical and stylistic embroidery or as a rhetoric device 
that induces the kind of emotions in its hearers that are evocative of those expressed in the 
symbolic language of the metaphor itself. As the language of rhetoric, metaphor is most often 
used by philosophers and politicians as the means for analogical understanding of complex 
everyday issues with the aid of much simpler logical counterparts which only differ in their 
linguistic adornment. In literature, metaphor is one of the tropes or figures of speech that show 
the writer’s ability to express what is ordinary in terms of out-of-the-ordinary stylistic 
expressions of natural language. 
                                                          
1 Ross (1959: 3339) 
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This work is not going to deal with the analysis of novel metaphorical expression, but its 
cognitive counterpart called conceptual metaphor. Although cognitive science abounds with 
theoretical approaches to conceptual metaphor, it took almost two thousand years to shatter the 
myth of distinction between literal and figurative language, their interrelatedness, use and 
application in everyday communication and experience of the world. This was achieved after the 
publication of Michael Reddy’s paper The Conduit Metaphor, which served as the stepping-
stone for the establishment of Cognitive Linguistics and the development of theories on 
conceptual metaphor which yielded a wide range of revolutionary scientific implications that 
shook up the whole scientific community and not just those field involved in linguistic and 
literary research. 
1.1 Conceptual Metaphor 
The groundbreaking 1980 work Metaphors We Live By was written by George Lakoff 
and Mark Johnson, who can be considered the architects of the conceptual metaphor research. 
This work should serve as the starting point for every study on the topic of conceptual metaphor 
because it gives primary and systematic insights into the characteristics and significance of 
conceptual metaphor, its construal, application and omnipresence. Just how much of our 
everyday language use is infected by conceptual metaphor seemed to go beyond our conscious 
comprehension and does so even today.  
Conceptual metaphor is the object of investigation of different neurosciences, especially 
Cognitive Linguistics, Psycholinguistics, social sciences and anthropology. Cognitive Linguistics 
is one of the youngest sciences in the world. It took its swing in the late ‘70s and the early ‘80s 
of the past century, with Lakoff and Johnson as it most prominent proponents. What this 
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revolutionary tandem claimed is that, unlike novel metaphor, conceptual metaphor is not only a 
matter of language, but a matter of thought as well. Conceptual metaphor, as its name suggests, 
is largely grounded in conceptual reasoning, especially that of embodiment. In other words, it is 
drawn from our physical interaction with the outer world. Therefore, it should not perhaps be 
considered reasoning at all, but rather intuiting of a sort because it most often happens 
unconsciously. 
However, it seems that a thesis on conceptual metaphor is not at all a young because 
Aristotle claimed that “[…] in defining contraries of every kind men have recourse to a spatial 
metaphor (italics mine), for they say that those things are contraries which, within the same 
class, are separated by the greatest possible distance”2. Lakoff would appreciate this statement, 
but his claims are much more far-reaching than that. He goes greater distances as to claim that 
even mathematics and logic which, up until that moment, were thought to be universally and 
eternally true, are also based on bodily experience just like everything in human cognizance and 
perception3. This claim dumbfounded scientific community to such extents that conceptual 
metaphor became the scope of investigation and interest of a wide range of sciences whose basic 
postulates fell into question after the theory on conceptual metaphor was established. 
Conceptual metaphor, universally found in almost all cultures, can be said to be an innate 
propensity of the human mind to simplify abstract mental concept and nature’s intricate 
phenomena by conceptualization for the purposes of easier understanding. It has its spring in the 
primitive human inclination to rely on sensorimotor abilities, with such experiential processes, of 
                                                          
2 Ross (1959: 17) 
3 Tay (2014: 55) 
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which we are most often unaware, being linked with our neural framework4. Therefore, 
conceptual metaphor should rather be comprehended as the product of cognition and perception 
rather than language. 
What is at play with conceptual metaphor are not merely words, but rather ideas or 
concepts, which are grounded in embodied experience. This is why, for instance, people 
understand the expression to have an idea on one’s mind in terms of ideas being physical items 
or objects, and mind being comprehended as a physical platform upon which they can be placed. 
This example serves to prove that “processing metaphoric meaning involves some imaginative 
understanding of the body’s role in structuring abstract concepts”5. 
1.2 The Scope of the Work 
Since all natural languages take their spring in human experience, which is visible in both 
semantic aspects of single lexical units, combinations of several lexical units into complex 
semantic units (such as, idioms, collocations, metaphors, and so on) and grammatical constructs 
(such as tenses, prepositional phrases, spatial indicators, pronouns, and so on), this work is going 
to deal with the importance of conceptual, cognitive or embodied metaphor, providing the reader 
with the understanding of how such linguistic and conceptual construct patterns came into being 
and what their omnipresent use might indicate about the nature of its users.  
Explaining the most important notions from the theories on conceptual metaphor, 
precisely, Conceptual Metaphor Theory and Blending Theory, discussing some substantial issues 
with regard to the two major opposing theoretical approaches to conceptual metaphor, giving 
                                                          
4 Gibbs (2005: 87 and 118) 
5 Gibbs (2005: 184) 
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further suggestions as to the path which researchers should pave for the development of the field, 
and offering some examples of conceptual metaphor from the South-Slavic languages will take 
up most of the word fund at the disposal for a B.A. thesis. That is why this work will be an 
overview of the most important issues within the conceptual metaphor research program, its 
applications and implications in other areas of research that deal with the significance and 
understanding of the wide theoretical and practical influences of conceptual metaphor, as well as 
the multidisciplinary course it might take in the future. 
2. The Most Important Notions From the Conceptual Metaphor Theories 
Theory on conceptual metaphor, as an endeavor within the Cognitive Linguistics research 
program, comprises many notions that make it not only a speculative theory but a true scientific 
theory with an empirical basis. This is achieved through the establishment of definitive notions 
which can be either denied or corroborated with empirical data. Therefore, when a theorist on 
conceptual metaphor claims that conceptual metaphor has embodiment as its primary condition 
for realization, such a stance is endorsed by offering ample instances of embodied linguistic 
constructs which prove that bodily experience is the crucial proviso for language construction 
and usage. In turn then, some cognitive linguists go even further as to claim that not only 
metaphor, but other linguistic expressions as well are grounded in bodily experience, including 
language itself as a systematic whole that shapes our thoughts.  
However, since cognitive linguists who support theories on conceptual metaphor assert 
that conceptual metaphor, as part of our cognitive system, is an embodied phenomenon, then all 
human thought as well should be conceived of as being embodied. This is a far-reaching and 
radical claim, which many linguistic researchers reserve from being associated with, because it 
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leaves no room for the establishment of a theory on thought. Other significant notions that 
represent the stepping-stone for a theory on conceptual metaphor are cross-domain mapping and 
image schemas. 
2.1 Embodiment 
Embodiment, within the conceptual metaphor investigation program, is at the same time 
the most important matter and the most serious bone of contention, even between thinkers who 
share the belief that language has an embodied basis. Conceptual metaphor, also referred to as 
embodied metaphor, as its name suggests, is grounded in bodily experience. 
One of the most often cited instances of conceptual metaphor is LOVE IS A JOURNEY. 
Therefore, when a person says, I feel as if we have entered a blind street, to its partner, the 
underlying concept behind the utterance is the idea that the emotion of love as an abstract 
concept has to be expressed with the aid of conceptual metaphor clothed in words in order for the 
speaker to convey the feeling and for the recipient of the message to understand how the other 
one feels. To understand the notion of embodiment better it would be good to cite the so-called 
embodiment premise and expound what it actually proposes. The premise states: 
“People’s subjective, felt experiences of their bodies in action provide part of the fundamental 
grounding for language and thought. Cognition is what occurs when the body engages the 
physical, cultural world and must be studied in terms of the dynamical interactions between people 
and the environment. Human language and thought emerge from recurring patterns of embodied 
activity that constrain ongoing intelligent behavior. We must not assume cognition to be purely 
internal, symbolic, computational, and disembodied, but seek out the gross and detailed ways that 
language and thought are inextricably shaped by embodied action” (Gibbs 2005: 276). 
 
Adopting such a claim leads to believing in a dynamic interaction between our minds and 
our bodies which, up until the emergence of cognitive sciences, were seen as independent, 
disparate and non-overlapping aspects of human nature. Prior to that, philosophers, linguists and 
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psychologists only debated about the influence of thought on language and of language on 
thought. Little or no attention was paid to the influence of embodied experience on language and 
thought and the mutual influence of all of these phenomena on one another. That is why 
conceptual metaphor theories and their most important aspect, namely, embodiment, made a 
great revolution as to how we understand our nature and the nature of our cognitive apparatus. 
One of the most intricate statements with regard to the embodiment hypothesis is the idea 
“that human physical, cognitive, and social embodiment ground our conceptual and linguistic 
systems”6. This assertion in itself is already controversial because it is circular. It aims to explain 
human cognitive and social endeavors by offering empirical data from those same starting points 
that are exactly in question. It is not a mistake to claim certain linguistic expressions as 
embodied, but when it comes to conceptual entities we should rather remain careful and less 
presumptuous as to what we label as being grounded in embodied experience. 
One experiment, Basso’s 1990 research7 of a Western Apache Indian language in which 
parts of the automobile are correspondent to those of human body parts (resulting in the MOTOR 
VEHICLES ARE HUMAN BODIES conceptual metaphor), is supposed to serve as an example 
of how conceptual metaphor comes into being. My opinion is that this example is not a good one 
because Indian culture through its historical development did not bring about motor vehicles, so 
they did not have the need to have lexical items for automobiles and their parts. Instead, when 
they encountered the finished product, namely, the automobile, they used the already existent 
words, ascribing them to this new invention that needed to be named for the purposes of easier 
communication when automotive world became the topic of conversation. Based on such 
                                                          
6 Rohrer (2007: 27) 
7 Gibbs (2005: 79-80) 
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reasoning, we can say that due to the lack of lexical items, the easiest way to convey thoughts 
regarding motor vehicles was to use the analogy to human body and its parts. This way, the idea 
of conceptual metaphor slowly dissipates into linguistic economy and practicality. 
Nevertheless, a number of other scientific studies and experiments conducted by 
cognitive linguists and other researchers interested in the development of conceptual metaphor 
theory give an abundance of empirical evidence which goes to show that embodied cognizance is 
indeed at play in understanding or constructing most of our abstract concepts. One of the most 
significant such experiments was conducted by Corriss’ and Kose’s in 19988 in which children 
observed an adult building a construction, pretending to be involved in the building process or 
imitating the task while looking at the picture of the configuration. More accuracy was achieved 
when the children either visualized or actually performed the construction of the buildings, than 
while observing the already assembled construction or the whole building process. This example 
goes to show that “imagination is an action-based process”9. 
2.2 Cross-domain Mapping 
Alongside embodiment, which represents the most important characteristic of conceptual 
metaphor, another term arises, which is just alike crucially important for the establishment of a 
theory on conceptual metaphor. This is the notion of cross-domain mapping10. It is called cross-
domain mapping because two domains are necessary for the conceptual metaphor to work its 
magic. These two domains are called the source and the target domain. On the one hand, source 
domain is the domain of the more accessible and understandable nature. The elements from the 
                                                          
8 Gibbs (2005: 237) 
9 Gibbs (2005: 237) 
10 Coulson (2008: 190) 
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source domain are usually those from the world which is possible to be experienced, namely, the 
world of the empirical. Therefore, the elements from the source domain are such entities and 
occurrences which can be accessed with our bodily senses. On the other hand, target domain is 
the domain of the abstract which is simplified with the aid of the source domain elements. Those 
elements are what cognitive linguists call image schemas, a term which will be explained in the 
following subsection.  
To exemplify the whole idea of cross-domain mapping let us use the TIME IS MOTION 
conceptual metaphor. The sentence, Eons will have passed when I stumble upon another chance 
like this, clearly shows how humans grasp the concept of time. Since time is an abstract idea, 
people need to express its meaning with the aid of something more accessible and palpable, such 
as motion, which is an action that we perform even when we inhale and exhale – parts of our 
bodies and our organs contract and expand. Motion is therefore a bodily endeavor that we 
practice incessantly, representing the source domain element which is mapped onto the target 
domain of time. 
But why do we understand time through the concept of motion is another question. In the 
following quote, Lakoff somewhat explains the issue: “the fact that time is understood 
metaphorically in terms of motion, entities, and locations accords with our biological knowledge. 
In our visual systems, we have detectors for motion and detectors for objects/locations. We do 
not have detectors for time […]. Thus, it makes good biological sense that time should be 
understood in terms of things and motion” (2007: 282). 
However, this is not entirely true. When we look at the sky we can see that the sun and 
the moon are interchanging on it, making us think that time indeed is motive, since the objects of 
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time (the sun and the moon) do exist in space and that they take certain locations in the sky, 
clearly delineating different temporal aspects of the day. Therefore, time can most definitely be 
understood as motion through space, but then the conceptual metaphor regarding time dissolves 
into its literal form of the human understanding of the phenomenon. When alike conceptual 
metaphors are understood on their most basic level we arrive at a conclusion that in such cases 
there is no unconscious working of conceptual metaphor in the background but rather of our 
direct experience with the phenomenon of time. Still, this does not belittle the importance of 
conceptual metaphor per se, only suggests that we should be more careful in analyzing 
conceptual metaphors, which will show whether one is really at play or not. 
Nevertheless, let us look at another example of cross-domain mapping. In ordinary 
language we often explain the concept of death in terms of the conceptual metaphor DEATH IS 
A (GRIM) REAPER. This is visible in the following example: Being sick, he feared death would 
come for the harvest. Since death is a natural event and a biological occurrence which, once 
experienced, prevents us from having post-experiential personal impressions, we have to resort 
only to superficial understanding of the phenomenon.  
Why death is understood as a reaper might come from our direct experience with the 
physical world. When a plant dies, it loses its vigor and droops as if being reaped. Also, when a 
man reaps a plant it means that it is mature enough and that its developmental period has come to 
an end. This is exactly what happens when a human being dies – hopefully, through life-long 
physical, intellectual, mental and spiritual growth, we reach the end of the cycle, when we are 
‘ready to be harvested and stored’ just like man does to crops. However, having a long literary 
and mythological history, this concrete conceptual metaphor makes it hard to conclude whether 
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we can talk of it being truly conceptual or perhaps of it being a dead novel metaphor which, 
through historical advancement of culture, simply lost its status of being metaphoric in nature. 
2.2.1 The Invariance Principle 
An important law that governs the application of cross-domain mapping is what some 
authors named the invariance principle. It is the claim “that the mapping from the source cannot 
violate the image-schematic structure of the target”11. For example, if one says, He is a sneaky 
snake, people of the western culture are more likely to ascribe the ‘psychological’ characteristics 
of the snake to the person, with the former being very sly and evil in a spiteful way, rather than 
ascribing to the person the way the snake moves or hisses. This is so because in our culture snake 
is the archetype of evilness due to the widespread Christian religion in which snake is the 
embodiment of the devil. Therefore, although snakes do not have a psyche, its archetypical 
characteristics bring about associations with the devil, which anthropomorphize the animal, 
giving it certain personality traits that we recognize in our fellow humans. In this example it is 
visible how conceptual metaphor works its magic in both directions. Not only is a human being 
understood in terms of an animal, but that same animal is understood in terms of having human 
characteristics. Only the selected characteristics from the source domain of the human psyche are 
mapped onto the target domain of the snake behavior, while likewise, only selected 
characteristics from the source domain of the snake ‘psyche’ are mapped onto the target domain 
of the human psyche. This is a clear-cut epitome of how the idea of conceptual metaphor has a 
long history and application, with us most of the time being unaware that such cognitive and 
creative endeavor takes place at all. 
                                                          
11 Oakley (2007: 223) 
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2.3 Image Schema 
Cross-domain mapping would not be able to be performed either, if there were not for 
another cognitive tool which helps its realization – it is called image schema. It can be said that 
image schema stands for “dynamic analog representations of spatial relations and movements in 
space. Although image schemas are derived from perceptual and motor processes, they are not 
themselves sensorimotor processes”12. In fact, as Johnson put it, image schemas are “primary 
means by which we construct or constitute order and are not mere passive receptacles into which 
experience is poured”13. 
Some of the most prominent and universal examples of image schemas, as proposed by 
Johnson, are: CONTAINER, BLOCKAGE, BALANCE, COUNTERFORCE, RESTRAINT 
REMOVAL, ENABLEMENT, PATH, CENTER-PERIPHERY, CYCLE, NEAR-FAR, PART-
WHOLE, MERGING, SPLITTING, FULL-EMPTY14. The phenomenon of image schema is not 
only marginally useful but also extremely evolutionary advantageous for our everyday tasks 
because it represents “the basis for organizing knowledge and reasoning about the world”15. 
Every image schema is a conceptual projection of a physical object, natural force or our 
interaction with it. 
Let us now take a look at an example of a conceptual metaphor which will explain the 
idea of image schema in more detail. In saying, He sang a gay song to keep our spirits up, being 
happy and cheerful almost necessitates standing upright, as if the joy makes our body stand tall 
                                                          
12 Gibbs (2005: 90-91) 
13 Johnson (1987: 30) 
14 Johnson (1987:126) 
15 Oakley (2007: 215) 
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and straight. That is why the image schema of VERTICALITY behind the HAPPINESS IS UP 
conceptual metaphor is indeed the one collected from embodied experience.  
Yet another example comes from the DIFFICULTIES ARE BURDENS conceptual 
metaphor field. In saying, The racial issue still weighs down on all of us, takes the idea that 
problems, especially those of psychological and social nature, make us behave in the same 
fashion as when lifting heavy physical objects. When someone is faced with an issue that cannot 
be easily solved, they get frustrated, sometimes even depressed, making the person walk 
crouched, with their head looking down. In the sentence example, image schemas of 
DISABLEMENT and COUNTERFORCE are at play. Such embodied experience is then 
transferred, or rather mapped onto the more abstract entities, in this case difficulties, which 
belong to the same realm of the non-physical as emotions, thus being understood almost 
exclusively in terms of sensorimotor experience. 
3. Conceptual Metaphor Theory 
The starting point for Conceptual Metaphor Theory (hereinafter CMT) is the postulate 
that the structure and functioning of language mirrors the structure and functioning of our 
minds16. This claim is by some still considered controversial, and rightfully so, because such 
inferences are made purely on the basis of how we use our natural languages and understand the 
world around us through the language prism. However, we do not have access to our thoughts 
directly, only through the medium of natural languages, leaving us with no language-independent 
conclusions with regard to our thoughts. Consequently, it means that once language is acquired it 
infects and affects the constitution and contents of the mind in such a fashion that thought and 
                                                          
16 Tay (2014: 52) 
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language start influencing each other with no clear delineation where one ends and the other one 
starts. Still, this issue is too great to be dealt with within the boundaries of this work. CMT, 
whose main proponents are the world-renowned George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, can best be 
explained as being based on three arguments, as proposed by Dennis Tay (2014: 52-53). 
a) Conventionality Argument 
Metaphor is not just a matter of poetic language. It is instead an omnipresent linguistic 
practice of which we are rarely conscious. Its occurrence shall most probably be found in all 
natural languages. That is why we can claim that it is a conventional everyday linguistic 
expression and not an example of a ‘literary linguistic deviance’. An example of this claim is the 
verb grasp, used to refer to human understanding of what has previously been unexplained. We 
grasp the meaning of metaphorical expressions without realizing that the verb used is actually 
itself of metaphoric nature. Another example is the conceptual metaphor KNOWING IS 
SEEING. I see where you are going with your arguments, clearly shows that understanding or 
cognizing something is equal to perceiving that which is prone to be empirically experienced or 
sensed. The application of such verbs in everyday communication shows the conventionality of 
conceptual metaphors. 
b) Conceptual Structure Argument 
Metaphor is not just a product of the linguistic structure, it is also a product of the 
cognitive structure. Following this claim, we can say that as language is motivated by our 
embodied experience which is lexicalized metaphorically, so our mental concepts must have the 
same metaphorical structure as well. If experience shapes language and language shapes thought, 
it might be the case that the process occurs in the opposite direction as well, with our thoughts 
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influencing language and our sensorimotor experience of the world. To exemplify, let us 
consider the following instance of the STATES ARE LOCATIONS and SEEING IS 
TOUCHING conceptual metaphors: He fell in love, being swept off his feet, as soon as he laid 
his eyes on her. In this case, an emotion is a kind of container one falls in, or a location that one 
enters. Love is thus conceptualized as locations and containers are, attracting the same sort of 
characteristics the latter possess, while visual perception is conceptualized as the act of touching. 
That is why we can set or lay our vision onto the object of perception, just like we can lay our 
hand onto physical objects. 
c) Embodiment Argument 
Almost exclusively are all concepts from the source domain those available to our bodily 
senses, having their origin in the world of possible physical experience. With their help, through 
the process of mapping, we arrive at the understanding of more abstract and idealized concepts 
from the target domain. This is the only way for us to understand ideas, emotions and non-
embodied occurrences which, by their nature, are not available to us in the empirical world. It 
seems that only by the metaphorical application of embodied experience onto such concepts can 
we grasp their meaning, nature and significance.  
An example from the SIMILARITY IS CLOSENESS and CATEGORIES ARE 
CONTAINERS conceptual metaphors fields might help understand the argument more 
meticulously. In saying, Their ideas are not exclusive of one another; rather, they closely relate 
in having equal implications, two ideas belong to the same class of thought, therefore they are 
not exclusive, but rather complementary. As a matter of fact, they can be placed into the same 
category, which acts as a container does in the physical world, with the assumption that closely 
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related things belong to the same set. Their relatedness or similarity manifests itself in their being 
close to each other, as similar object are physically near in the experiential world (certain plants 
from the same family can be found close to each other in nature). This experiential basis acts as a 
framework for all abstract entities, in this case theoretical ideas, naturally expanding over the 
whole range of non-physical idealized entities. 
To support the CMT framework, let us consider several instances of conceptual 
metaphors from the South-Slavic languages. In saying, Nabiti nekome rogove, a vexed person is 
represented as an animal with horns, which are usually considered stubborn and nervous, 
exuding anger upon those who provoke them. Someone who para nosom oblake, contains the 
idea that being prideful is being gigantic, standing erect and tall to the point where one’s head 
reaches clouds. Similarly, Biti glavom u oblacima, embodies the idea that profound thinking is 
vertical elevation. Contrary to that, Pustiti mozak na ispašu, exemplifies the idea that being 
careless and thoughtless is walking cattle on pasture, where thoughts are represented as sheep or 
some other animal. When a person from the Balkans stane nekome na rep, incorporates the idea 
that making enemies is provoking an animal, especially the wild one which will defend itself by 
counterattacking.  
Okaljati nekome obraz refers to the idea that being honorable means having clean body, 
which only accounts for carnal misbehavior, clearly disregarding other types of immoral 
misdeeds. Uzeti nekoga na zub instantiates the kind of reasoning which implies that to have it in 
with someone is to viciously hunt prey as a predator does a catch. The last, but not the least, 
Živjeti pod staklenim zvonom, contains the idea that excessive security and safety are 
conceptualized as living under a glass dome, which recalls the embodied idea of earth being 
covered with the atmospheric ‘gas dome’.  
17 
 
Just to show the inconsistency between the Anglo-Saxon and South-Slavic cultures, let us 
take a look at the English proverb, People who live in glass houses should not throw stones. 
Obviously, the former culture considers glass as a fragile material, embodying weakness, 
helplessness and frailty, while the latter, for some reason, perceives a glass construction as the 
one offering a safe haven. 
3.1 Primary Metaphors 
Within the Conceptual Metaphor Theory, there is a more fundamental theoretical 
subcategory called primary metaphor, as developed by Joseph Grady. With regard to the 
definiton of primary metaphors he claims that they are “simple patterns, like Lakoff and 
Johnson’s MORE IS UP, which map fundamental perceptual concepts onto equally fundamental 
but not directly perceptual ones”17. With the finding of primary metaphor, Lakoff’s and 
Johnson’s conceptual metaphor turned out to be complex, or rather possible to be deconstructed 
into more primitive constituent elements.  
Therefore, a complex conceptual metaphor like THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS can be 
further broken down into two more basic conceptual constituents, namely, ORGANIZATION IS 
PHYSICAL STRUCTURE and PERSISTING IS REMAINING ERECT18. This finding 
provoked cognitive linguists to apply themselves more meticulously to the analysis of conceptual 
frameworks and their basic elements. Primary metaphors are “thought to be universally acquired 
prior to language as a natural function of the way the human body interacts with the material 
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environment”19 and, unlike complex conceptual metaphors, all are experience-based, and as such 
result from “correlations between sensorimotor concepts and subjective experience”20. 
The following list represents a set of some of the corresponding source-target concepts 
that belong to the scope of primary metaphors, which serve as basic constituent elements for all 
complex conceptual metaphors: UP-DOMINANT, DOWN-SAD, HEAVY-DIFFICULT, 
BRIGHT-HAPPY, FORWARD-SUCCESS, BACKWARD-THE PAST, SWEET-APPEALING, 
FORCE-COMPULSION21. Lakoff and Johnson not only accepted Grady’s criticism but they 
also incorporated his contributive findings into their CMT framework, which resulted in the 
more primitive CMT which became more stable and resistant against the attacks from other 
theoretical headquarters. Still, some authors imply that primary metaphors might actually be 
metonymic, thus placing the weight of proof on its proponents. 
3.1.1 Unidirectionality 
Unlike complex conceptual metaphors, primary metaphors affirm the claim that they 
work on the principle of unidirectionality22. This principle states that the elements mapped from 
the source domain onto the target domain cannot become the elements of the target domain in 
that same conceptual metaphor chain without arriving at, if not a nonsensical, than at least a 
nonconventional metaphoric expression. For example, based on the THEORIES ARE 
BUILDINGS conceptual metaphor, it is completely common to say, The two researchers have 
laid a firm stepping stone for the future upgrade of their scientific theory. However, it would be 
most unusual to say, The building’s basic principles stand resistant against the challenge of 
                                                          
19 Lakoff (2007: 264) 
20 Steen (2014: 124) 
21 Grady (2007: 192-193) 
22 Grady (2007: 193) 
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architectural arguments. From this example it is visible why certain complex conceptual 
metaphors work only in one direction but not in the opposite.  
But Lakoff and Johnson claimed unidirectionality even for their complex conceptual 
metaphor which proved not to be the case. One example of bidirectionalilty with regard to 
conceptual metaphor includes the following example. It would be absolutely natural to say both, 
She is the lioness in her line of work, as well as, The lion showed such strength of character in 
resisting its prey that eventually it freed it from its claws. On the one hand, the person in the 
former example acquired characteristics of a lion, being fierce and brave in facing competition in 
her working environment. On the other hand, the lion in the latter example acquired the 
characteristics of a person, exuding the power of will and mercy, which are usually reserved only 
for sentient and morally conscious beings. This example shows the violation of the principle of 
unidirectionality, which means that certain conceptual metaphors can further be broken down 
into more elementary conceptual units. 
4. Blending Theory 
Blending Theory (hereinafter BT), by some critics considered CMT’s nemesis, while by 
others its complement, is another approach to the study of conceptual metaphor and cognitive 
concepts in general. Developed by Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner, conceptual blending 
represents dynamic interaction between embodied concepts, or rather conceptualized physical 
objects, and disembodied abstract ideas originating from our working memory, which are prone 
to be stored in our long-term memory.  
The blending process is governed by the so-called vital relations which include: analogy, 
disanalogy, similarity, space, time, identity, change, cause-effect, part-whole, property, category 
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and so on23. These notions, which could be understood as Aristotelian categories in the sphere of 
conceptual metaphor research system, seem to explain by themselves how the process of 
metaphoric conceptualization takes place, which is something CMT lacks. Yet, the following 
quote serves to show the real difference between the two opposing approaches: “whereas CMT 
has been primarily concerned with identifying regular, conventional patterns of metaphorical 
conceptualization […], BT has often explicitly addressed itself to novel and unique examples 
which do not arise from entrenched cross-domain relationships” (Grady, Oakley & Coulson 
2007: 424). 
Based on this claim, we can say that the true advantage of BT over CMT is that it 
involves real-time on-line conceptual processing, with the latter approach simply being inferior 
in this aspect. Blending theorists thus claim that real-time conceptual blends are not, although 
can become, entrenched, as it is the case with the elements involved in cross-domain mapping. 
Instead, they arise and are created spontaneously. If they are evolutionary advantageous or used 
conventionally within the boundaries of a collective, they naturally become entrenched, as it is 
the case with grammatical constructs. However, for an immediate on-line conceptual blend to 
spring up, there has to exist at least a basic correlating mapping, in which the blend is grounded. 
There is yet another difference between BT and CMT, and that is directionality. While 
BT has a bidirectional or multidirectional nature, CMT is only unidirectional. This means that 
the interaction between mental spaces, unlike conceptual domains, is less constrained and fixed, 
and more free and dynamic, which results in creation of novel metaphorical and conceptual 
                                                          
23 Turner (2007: 381) 
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constructs on the spot, in all forms of human endeavor, including commercials, jests, non-verbal 
communication and behavior24. 
However, conceptual blending is not “a compositional algorithmic process”, which is a 
characteristic sometimes ascribed to cross-domain mapping in the CMT framework, and “cannot 
be modeled”, making interaction between blends unpredictable, unless we observe the process 
“solely from the structure of the inputs”25. In this sense, blends “comply with competing 
optimality constraints […], and with locally relevant functional goals”, which means that “the 
most suitable analog for conceptual integration is not chemical composition but biological 
evolution”26. Perhaps this is the best argument speaking in favor of the BT’s theoretical and 
practical framework over the CMT’s. 
4.1 Mental spaces 
While the CMT program requires only two domains between which the process of 
conceptual mapping occurs unidirectionally from the source to the target domain, with them 
having locked, permanent relations, BT has two more domains, actually called mental spaces, 
which are present context-dependent and -activated, and which have more dynamic 
interrelations. Authors define mental space as “a partial and temporary representational structure 
which speakers construct when thinking or talking about a perceived, imagined, past, present, or 
future situation”27. Mental spaces should not be equated with conceptual domains; instead, they 
“represent particular scenarios which are structured by given domains”28. 
                                                          
24 Birdsell (2014: 72) 
25 Fauconnier & Turner (2007: 362) 
26 Fauconnier & Turner (2007: 362) 
27 Grady, Oakley & Coulson (2007: 421) 
28 Grady, Oakley & Coulson (2007: 421) 
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As Fauconnier proposes, mental spaces, which are connected semantically, conceptually 
and experientially, are organized in frames29. Therefore, the concepts of fight, battle, weapon, 
uniform, headquarters and soldier belong to the collective frame of war. The spectrum of mental 
spaces consists of “two ‘input’ spaces (which, in a metaphorical case, are associated with the 
source and target of CMT), plus a ‘generic’ space, representing conceptual structure that is 
shared by both inputs, and the ‘blend’ space, where material from the inputs combines and 
interacts” (Grady, Oakley & Coulson 2007: 421). 
Therefore, when one says, She is a true working bee in her department, the activation of 
mental spaces can be explained in the following fashion. The source input space invokes the 
elements of the bee behavior; the target input space contains the elements of human personality 
and psyche; the generic space creates conceptual patterns based on the person and bees sharing 
the hard-working nature, having bustling working environment, being passionately applied to 
their working tasks; and finally, the blend space meshes certain personality traits of a human 
being with the characteristics of the bee behavior, resulting in a human woman’s personality 
being conceptualized by behavioral patterns of a bee. 
However, as can be seen from the analysis of the aforementioned example, conceptual 
blending is not a simple process. It involves four steps; namely, composition, completion and 
elaboration, plus projection of structure from the blended space to the inputs30. If we are led by 
the principle of Ockham’s razor, which states that a theory with less postulates is the one more 
probable or apt to be true, then BT is indeed inferior to CMT because it has four mental spaces, 
unlike the latter which only has two domains between which the process of mapping occurs.  
                                                          
29 Fauconnier (2007: 352) 
30 Grady, Oakley & Coulson (2007: 425 and 437) 
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But simplicity and economy are not always to be the main criteria for a successful theory; 
it should rather be its implications and applications. Therefore, what BT has as an advantage to 
CMT is its ability to account for a wider scope of ‘linguistic anomalies’, such as novel metaphors 
which emerge from a conceptual process involved in creating newly-coined literary metaphorical 
expressions, proverbs, and metaphysical discourse constructs, such as counterfactuals and 
conditionals. 
To endorse the BT framework, let us resort to some examples from the South-Slavic 
languages, which I believe, cannot be accounted for by the CMT approach. In saying, Pala mi je 
ideja na pamet, we are conceptualizing ideas in terms of shooting stars falling from the skies 
upon our mind, which plays the role of the earth. This is very reminiscent of Plato’s idea that 
concepts, of which earthly entities are mere faulty counterparts, reside perfect and idealized in 
the ‘celestial realm of ideas’. But the CMT framework, unlike its theoretical foe, cannot account 
for this because there is no embodied basis in experiencing ideas, only the history of its cultural 
and practical metaphorical use, upon which BT is grounding its postulates.  
Another example speaking in favor of the BT approach is the talk of possible worlds 
which CMT regards as being non-metaphorical. When one says, Da nije bilo potresa, zgrada se 
ne bi urušila, we are talking about a ‘possible world’ or a state of affairs which is not, but could 
have been the case. Possible worlds can be understood as conceptualized or idealized 
metaphorical ‘dummies’ of the real world, with the propensities of its objects marking possible 
scenarios which are already ‘contained’ in the existent world, but which are not, although can be, 
instantiated or realized in it.  
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Additionally, a number of conceptual metaphors based on ‘bird life’ have arisen in the 
South-Slavic languages. When we want to express the feeling of safety, of someone watching 
over us, or of us being someone’s protégé, we will say, Uzeo me je pod svoje krilo or Živim pod 
okriljem svog zaštitnika. The old folk saying, Svaka ptica svome jatu leti, is another such 
example. In this proverb an organization or a group of people with the same worldviews are 
represented as a flock of birds. If an individual identifies with them, this means that he or she has 
such mentality and stances on life which drew them to the flock. But the psychological 
motivation behind this example is not embodied, thus not being able to be accounted for by 
CMT. For people who live their lives under a ruthless motto, a South-Slavic person would say, 
On živi pod krilaticom ‘cilj opravdava sredstva’.  
Shy and self-sufficient people žive u svojoj ljusci. When explaining to a child how 
children are born, people from the Balkans would say, Donijela ga je roda. All of these 
examples have their roots in oral tradition. Mythology of the Balkans claims that a great bird had 
spawned an egg from which the world hatched. This goes to show that certain conceptual 
metaphors from South-Slavic languages, which are motivated by bird life, are not really 
embodied, or at least not exclusively. They are instead inspired by and rooted in the 
mythological tradition. 
Lastly, in the 2.2.1 section, we have seen an instance of a conceptual metaphor which 
could have hardly emerged solely based on embodied experience, unless we take into 
consideration the psychological motivation behind it as well, and BT does exactly that. Why is 
an animal like snake the embodiment of the devil in our culture? There are hundreds of vicious 
animals in nature that could have become the conceptual item representing the devil and evil, but 
snake somehow took that role predominantly. In the time of rising religions, Christianity had to 
25 
 
have an enemy to oppose, and the Eastern religions, some of which regard snake as a godly 
animal, made a great candidate. This conceptual metaphor should thus be understood from the 
anthropological, cultural and psychological perspectives, which are the fields of investigation of 
the BT researchers, rather than solely being based on embodiment. 
5. Conclusions 
Conceptual metaphor, as could be seen throughout this work, is a theoretical framework 
within the scope of Cognitive Linguistics, which prompted a revolution in linguistics, literature, 
different neurosciences and psychology. With the establishment of a theory on conceptual 
metaphor, literary metaphor lost its status as a novel linguistic, literary expression, and became 
an everyday cognitive occurrence, with all people as its unconscious creators. Conceptual 
metaphor likewise brought about the revolution in how we perceive, comprehend and 
conceptualize ourselves as cognitive sentient beings, the world around us, but also the world 
within us, namely, the world of abstractions.  
Although CMT engendered other theoretical and scientific approaches to the research of 
this important cognitive phenomenon, it seems, as shown in the 4.1 section, that the dynamic BT 
has a more versatile application, being involved not only in the investigation of novel 
metaphorical expressions, which CMT is disregarding in favor of recurrent everyday patterns of 
conceptual metaphor, but also in the talk of possible worlds which represents an everyday 
understanding of our realities. BT’s wide variety of interest in a whole range of research fields, 
especially those of culture, literature, anthropology and other subfields of social sciences and 
humanities, makes it an inexhaustible mine of precious scientific development.  
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BT researchers, like Lakoff and Johnson did in the 1980s, are thinking out of the box. If 
we are to dive into the recurrent patterns of metaphorical conceptualization in myths, legends, 
fairytales, proverbs, religion, arts, literature, philosophy and psychology, perhaps we would be 
able to find a universal neural language that we all share completely unaware of it, while it 
permeates all of our cognitive, creative and behavioral endeavors. It seems that the BT 
researchers are on the right track to achieve that. 
However, some authors deem BT to be just a complement to the CMT theoretical 
framework. If that is the case, then only a fusion of these two theories can yield deeper insights 
into the nature of our cognitive apparatus and the phenomenon of natural language which, after 
centuries of scientific strains, is still seizing our attention and efforts in trying to probe into its 
core, origins and meaning. By discovering universal conceptual patterns in all lines of human 
intellectual endeavor we might accomplish even more than that. 
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